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This is a summary paper of the author’s book in Japanese, Difficulties and Challenges, Japan’s 
Post-War History of Monetary Policy and Economic Trends (Iwanami Shoten, 2016). For the Bank of 
Japan, these 70 years are indeed a repetitive succession of difficulties and challenges, and resulting 
successes and failures. The first difficulty was to pursue two contradictory policy purposes, namely 
stimulating investments to restore supply capacity and depressing hyper inflation more than 300% 
under a fixed exchange rate in the Occupation period. Unexpectedly, an enormous increase in 
external demand generated by the Korean War in 1950-51 solved the dilemma and the pre-war level 
of the Japanese economy was restored in 1953. The successful catch-up story of extraordinary rapid 
growth started thanks to the Bretton Woods System under which free trade, capital, and technology 
transfer enabled Japan to perform export-investment led high growth and to achieve 
industrialization around 1970. 
 Then three surprise shocks came from abroad: the so-called Nixon shock followed by the 
Smithsonian Accord in 1971; the Plaza Accord and Louvre Accord in 1985-87; and the Lehman shock 
in 2008. Each shock caused sharp appreciation of the yen, but the economic implications from each 
are different. The essence of the first is a correction of the depreciated yen under the fixed nominal 
exchange rate system in which the effective real rate of the yen had been in a depreciating trend 
because of the inflation rate differential between Japan and abroad. Japan’s policy reaction was so 
extreme as to cause domestic inflation which further flared in the first oil crisis. 
 The second shock would have been also smaller if the binding of Japanese monetary policy by 
participating in the so-called “International Policy Coordination” program had not caused asset 
bubbles as the consequence of an internationally-compelled easy money policy. 
 The third was a real shock because it spoiled the successful exit from deflation and turned “the loss 
of 7 years” to “15 years”. 
 The story of successful “Stronger Country” Japan in 1975-84 and the failure of too hasty fiscal 
consolidation in 1997 which resulted in extended deflation are also discussed. As for today’s 
monetary policy, since the final goal of full employment is almost achieved, pursuing an 
intermediate target of 2% inflation rate is meaningless, and the BOJ should start the exit policy. A 
positive immigration policy to increase Japan’s working population is also proposed to raise the 




I. Japan’s Economy and Monetary Policy in the Developing Period 
 
1. Industrial Reconstruction under the Hyper Inflation and the Risk of Economic Crisis 
 When the war was over in 1945, 25% of Japan’s national wealth was lost and the level of industrial 
production was 43% lower than the 1941 peak. In fiscal 1946, while the real GNP was 53% of the 1939 
pre-war peak, the nominal GNE was 14.3 times as much as the pre-war peak as a contingence of 
rampant inflation. According to the published statistics, the inflation rate of the wholesale price index 
was 4.6 times, and that of the retail price index was 6.1 times in 1946. Actual inflation rate must be 
far higher since black market prices were not included in the indices. Monetary policy faced difficulty 
in pursuing two contradictory purposes at the same time, namely stimulating investments to restore 
supply capacity and depressing the hyper inflation. 
 The sources of exploding demand were three. First, there were enormous fiscal expenditure for 
compensation to the former military and munition factories, and the costs of Allied occupying forces. 
The amount was larger than fiscal expenditure to pursue the war. Second, fiscal expenditures were 
made to reconstruct infrastructure and of subsidies to reconstruct industries. Third, private 
consumption and business investments increased based on drawing down deposits and bank lendings. 
The first and the second fiscal expenditures were financed by government bonds issue which was 
directly underwritten by the Bank of Japan. BOJ’s government bond holding increased 4.9 times in 
1946 and 4.2 times in 1947. The private demand for funds was also refinanced by BOJ’s lendings to 
banks which increased 50% each year in 1946 and 1947. Further, the government established the 
Reconstruction Public Finance Corporation which issued public corporation bonds to provide 
industrial reconstruction funds. Those bonds were also underwritten directly by the BOJ. 
 Thus, the real growth rate reached 8.6% in fiscal 1947 and 12.7% in fiscal 1948 and the supply 
capacity increased rapidly, but inflation rates of WPI remained 2.7 times and that of CPI +82.7% even 
in 1948 because of BOJ’s credit expansion. 
 In 1949, the U.S.’s strategy toward Japan changed under the circumstance of tightening of the Cold 
War, in which, as the fortress in Far East Asia, Japanese economy should stand on its own legs 
without financial support from the U.S. Following the order from the U.S. government through SCAP 
(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), the government budget for fiscal 1949 was set as a 
balanced budget with small surplus and the Reconstruction Public Finance Corpolation was closed. 
One of the routes of the hyper inflation, BOJ’s direct underwriting of the government bonds and RPFC 
bonds, was cut. SCAP also instructed the government to set a single exchange rate of 1 dollar = 360 
yen in April 25, 1949. This rate was decided to reflect the purchasing power parity based on the 
wholesale price index (WPI) in both countries. However, since the Japanese WPI did not include black 
market prices, it was a yen appreciated rate. 
 In order to prevent the severe recession or even crisis resulting from the balanced budget and the 
appreciated fixed yen rate, the BOJ increased lending to banks and purchasing government bonds 
from the private sector. 
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 BOJ succeeded in sustaining the economic growth, but the WPI inflation rate remained 60%, deficit 
in balance of trade and services decreased only a bit, and Japan had to rely on the financial support 
from the U.S. In 1950, SCAP, based on the home government instruction, urged not only the balanced 
budget, but also the stringent monetary policy. It was like “Greece in Euro System” today. In order to 
keep the fixed exchange rate, if the income adjustments such as super balanced budget and severe 
tight monetary policy had been used, the economy would have fallen into a recession or even crisis. 
 At the time when BOJ was obliged to consider a new stringent policy framework, in June 1950, the 
Korean War suddenly occurred and Japan could get rid of the Greece situation. 
 The balance of trades and services in 1950 became surplus for the first time since the end of the war, 
thanks to the U.S. army’s big demand for goods and services in Japan and the sharp increase in the 
Japanese export to the world where big economic expansion occurred, stimulated by the U.S.’s 
enormous import of strategic goods. The real growth rate reached 11% in 1950, 13% in 1951, and 11% 
in 1952. The three years of successive high growth was accompanied by increases in real fixed 
investments of 21% in 1952 and 13% in 1953, and real private consumption per person in 1953 
exceeded the pre-war peak. Post-war reconstruction of the economy was achieved. 
 Politically the Peace Treaty was concluded in September 1951. 
 
2. The Catching up Period of Extraordinary Rapid Growth. 
 The double-digit percentage growth of the successive three years, 1950-52, finally resulted in the 
deficit of the trade and service balance in 1953, and the tight monetary policy started in autumn. The 
resultant recession caused large export pressure and sharp import decline and the business recovery 
started in December 1954. The balance of trade and services in 1955 became surplus which was higher 
than the peak at the time of the Korean War. 
 This is the beginning of the “stop and go” policy in the post-war Japan until 1970. During the time, 
the Japanese tradable goods prices fluctuated very much due to the “stop and go”, but on an average 
had been very stable, while other industrialized economies, particularly in the U.S. which had no 
balance of payments constraint, had creeping inflation. Accordingly, the differential of the inflation 
rate between Japan and other industrialized nations had widened, and the real exchange rate of the 
yen against the world had been depreciating. This trend in the exchange rate is one of the reason for 
Japan’s high economic growth, averaging 10% in 1955-1970. 
 Another important reason was  the free trade and capital movements under the Bretton Woods 
system. Japan had manufactured tradable goods with transferred technology of the same level and 
lower wages so that Japanese exports had been very competitive. Japan’s rapid growth was the so-
called “export and investments led growth,” and the economic policy, including monetary policy, gave 
efforts to promote exports and fixed investment. 
 As the result of the depreciating trend in the real effective rate of the yen, the Japanese current 
account balance had become continuously surplus since 1968. Internationally, Japan had excess 
assets over liabilities with large foreign reserves, and in the flow of fund tables, the external sector 
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became the deficit sector. Another important change in the table is the public sector becoming deficit 
with continuous issue of government bonds. Thus, the excess savings of the household sector became 
absorbed not only by the business sector, but also by the public sector and the external sector through 
the various financial markets. Developments in the financial markets were also stimulated by the 
deregulation of interest rates and of the financial system. The transmission mechanism of the 
monetary policy was also affected by such developments. The BOJ’s market operations caused 
changes in the various interest rates in financial markets which in turn affected the behavior of 
financial institutions and business firms. BOJ’s “window guidance”, which was a kind of moral 
suasion about increase in lending by big commercial banks to their customers, had become less 
effective and less important since BOJ’s lending to big commercial banks gave way to BOJ’s market 
operations in supplying the monetary base. 
 Such a change in the transmission channel became decisive from 1974 when the floating exchange 
rate system started. 
 
3. Sudden Change in the International Environment and BOJ’s First Big Failure 
 Thus around 1970, Japan’s industrialization to catch up with advanced nations was achieved. 
 In the internationally opposite direction of the big change in Japan’s economic structure, the collapse 
of the foundation of the Bretton Woods System were proceeding. In that system the U.S. dollar, the 
key currency, was always convertible to gold. However, as the current account surplus of Japan and 
West Germany increased and the current account deficits of the U.S. expanded, the U.S. liquid 
liability exceeded its gold reserves and the U.S. lost the ability of gold convertibility. [Chart1] 
 In August 1971, the U.S. one-sidedly declared the suspension of the convertibility between gold and 
the U.S. dollar, and called the international meetings at the Smithsonian Institute to realign the  
exchange rates. It was decided to appreciate the yen 16.88% against the U.S. dollar. However, the 
selling speculation of the dollar vis-à-vis the yen continued in the market, and finally Japan decided 
to float the yen in February 1973, and European nations followed Japan in March. The Bretton Woods 
system collapsed definitely and the yen / dollar rate floated up to 254 yen, which is a 42% appreciation 
from 360 yen. 
 During the turmoil of the exchange markets, Japanese exports continued to expand and business 
recovery with the rise in the WPI started in early1972. However, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who 
was very surprised at the sharp appreciation of the yen, anticipated the serious recession, so he 
implemented a large supplementary budget for fiscal 1972 and further prepared the super big budget 
for fiscal 1973. The BOJ, which had already cut the official rate four times each by 0.25% from October 
1970 to July 1971, further cut the rate twice each by 0.5%, once immediately after the Smithsonian 
conference and once in July 1972. The increase in money stocks (M2) over the year reached 26.5% at 
the end of 1972, which was higher than during the high growth period, and was called “excess 
liquidity”. 
 In April 1973, BOJ started to raise the official rate, and in May the government postponed the 
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implementation of public investment in the budget. However, this change in fiscal and monetary 
policies was clearly too late; in September 1973, the WPI rose 18.9% and the CPI rose 14.4% over the 
year. It was when the first oil crisis attacked Japan. In fiscal 1973, 77.4% of Japan’s energy depended 
on the oil, 99.7% of which was imported. People rushed to buy the oil-related goods in anticipation of 
price rise, and the WPI rose 37.2% while the CPI rose 24.9% over the year in February 1974. 
 This was the first big failure of monetary policy since the end of the war. The main reasons for such 
delay in policy change are two. First, politicians, government officials, businessmen, and journalists, 
all estimated enormous deflationary effects of the yen appreciation upon the economy judging from 
the bitter experience in 1930. But the second, more essential reason is the lack of the central bank 
independence. At that time, under the Bank of Japan Law which was made during the war in 1917, 
the government had the authority to direct the BOJ’s monetary policy and to dismiss the Governor of 
the BOJ. Although the BOJ proposed the policy change to the government in autumn 1972, it was 
rejected until April 1973. 
 
4. Learning Lessons from the Policy Failure and the Appearance of the “Stronger Country” Japan 
 In December 1974, Governor Teiichiro Morinaga and Deputy Governor (Governor form 1979) Haruo 
Mayekawa were nominated. They examined the process of the policy failure and the following three 
lessons were shared by members of the Executive Board. 
 First, it took too long for the BOJ to get the policy change permission from the government since it 
was not easy for BOJ officials to persuade government bureaucrats to share the same judgment as to 
the economic trend and appropriate policy. Second, although BOJ implemented the window guidance 
to hold down bank lending in 1972, it was not at all effective as far as interest rates in the market 
together with the official rate remained the same. Third, BOJ did not pay due attention to the 
enormous increase in the money supply as an intermediate target. 
 The three important changes in the implementation of BOJ’s monetary policy had been carried out 
during 10 years, 1975-84, under Governor Morinaga and Mayekawa. First, they never left the 
negotiation of monetary policy changes with government administrators , but rather directly met the 
Prime Minister officially and unofficially to exchange views and share the same judgement as to 
monetary policy implementation. Governor Morinaga raised the official rate 0.75% or 1.00% three 
times, totally 2.75% during 8 months from April 1979 and Governor Mayekawa raised it 2.75% each 
in February and March 1980 to 9.00%, in order to prevent the imported cost push inflation resulting 
from the second oil crisis from causing the domestic inflation. The result was successful. Such smart 
changes in monetary policy were only possible when the Governor of the BOJ himself was always in 
touch with Prime Minister to share views. 
 Second, the policy implementation changed from the “Window Guidance” type to the “Market 
Operation” type under two Governors’ leadership. As already stated in the last part of Chapter 2, 
developments in the various financial markets caused BOJ’s market operation to be more effective 
with the various market players than window guidance only for BOJ’s customer banks. 
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 Third, the intermediate target changed from the increases in bank lendings of the customer banks, 
which is the object of the window guidance, to the outstanding money supply. In 1975, BOJ started to 
estimate the change in the state of money of the following quarter under the given policy 
implementation, and began to publish it from third quarter of 1978. It was not monetary targeting 
but “money focusing policy”. During 10 years until 1984 when Governor Mayekawa retired, the 
change in the money supply over the year had a declining trend from 15% to 7% with small 
fluctuations, so that nominal GNP growth slowed from 20% to 7%, while real GNP had the stable 
trend of about 5%, and therefore the GNP deflation slowed from 5% to 0%. [Chart2] 
 In the world economy at that time, facing the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the shift to the 
floating exchange rate system, and two oil crises, each country in “uncharted territory” was fighting 
against the “trilemma”, namely current account deficit, inflation and recession. Japan was first 
concentrating on depressing inflation with “money focusing” policy, and the price stability resulted in 
current account surplus and business recovery. At the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD 
(which I often attended as a delegate from the BOJ), Japan, with West Germany and the U.S., was 
called “the stronger country”. Leaving the exchange rate to the market, Japan concentrated on the 




II. Setbacks of the Japanese Economy 
 
1. Emergence of Asset Bubbles 
 With such a favorable trend in Japan’s economy, suddenly a difficult problem came from abroad. It 
was the Plaza Accord in September 1985. By participating in the so-called “International Policy 
Coordination,” Japanese monetary policy was forced to change the policy goal from the “sustained 
growth through price stability” to “inducing the U.S. dollar depreciation” in the market. BOJ joined 
the “cooperative intervention” with European major countries to depreciate the dollar in the market, 
and limited decline in the interest rate to prevent the recession resulting from the sharp appreciation 
of the yen within a range in which the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the declining U.S. rate did 
not widen. (So-called “cooperative interest rate cut.”) 
 Thus, the U.S. dollar had depreciated enough in February 1987, so that the Louvre Accord was 
concluded to stop further depreciation of the dollar which would be counter-productive to every 
country. As a result, the nature of the “cooperative interest rate cut” had changed. Although the 
Japanese economy was recovering from early 1987, BOJ had to cut the interest rate cooperatively to 
prevent the dollar from depreciating further. Internal and external policy goals became clearly 
contradictory.   
 Towards autumn 1987, BOJ and Deutsche Bundesbank had been leading the inter-bank money 
market rate to rise. The market had expected the official rate rise from its super low level towards 
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the end of the year, and the market’s long-term rate had started to rise. All of a sudden on October 
19, Monday, capital flight from the N.Y. markets occurred with a result of triple downward effect, 
namely the sharp price decline in U.S. bonds, stocks and currency. At the request from the U.S. for 
policy coordination, Japan was obliged to decrease, instead of increase, the official rate and had left 
the super low rate of 2.5% for 27 months until May 1989 although the economy had been recovering 
vigorously. 
 It is such binding of Japanese monetary policy by the so-called “International Policy Coordination” 
that caused asset bubbles. Recognizing such international political pressure, market participants 
believed the “Permanent Law Interest Rate” myths, and speculative rises in prices of real estate and 
stocks proceeded. Prices of goods and services, which had not risen so much by 1988, also started to 
soar when appreciation of the yen stopped in 1989. Confirming bottoming out of the dollar, the BOJ 
started to raise the official rate five times from 2.5% in May 1989 to 6.0% in August 1990. Facing such 
a radical change in financial circumstances, bubbles in stocks collapsed in early 1990, followed by 
bursting of the bubbles in real estate prices in 1991. 
 As a result of the collapse of asset bubbles, balance sheets of business firms and financial institutions 
deteriorated, with shrinking assets but remaining liabilities, so that they reduced their investment 
and lendings. The real growth rate declined from +6.0% in fiscal 1990 to +2.2% in fiscal 1991 +1.1% 
in fiscal 1992 and finally -1.0% in fiscal 1993. 
 This was the second big failure of post-war monetary policy. 
 
2. Too Hasty Fiscal Consolidation Destroyed the Recovering Trend 
 The BOJ cut the official rate seven times from 6.00% in July 1991 to 1.75% in September 1993. 
Public investment expanded 30% in fiscal 1992-1993. The real growth rate recovered to +2.3% in fiscal 
1994, +2.4% in fiscal 1995, and +3.7% in fiscal 1996 mainly led by recovery of private consumption 
and investment, and business profits also started to recover. [Table1] If this recovery led by the private 
sector had continued, the hangover from the bursting of the bubbles in the balance sheet would have 
been disposed of by the early 21st century. 
 However this scenario was broken down by the budget for fiscal 1997, which reduced the 13 trillion 
yen deficit resulting from the stimulative fiscal policy in fiscal 1992-93 and decline in tax receipts. As 
a Member of the House of Representatives, I told Prime Minister Hashimoto several times about the 
dangerous negative effect of such super balanced budget on the recovering economy, but he executed 
it. It seemed to me that he had not known how large the bad loans in the banking sector were. The 
serious financial crisis, including bankruptcies of large banks and security houses, occurred in 
November 1997 and continued to December 1998. In the process, the government committed two 
errors. First it had not offered fiscal support to ailing large financial institutions until they actually 
failed. This attitude caused much greater turmoil in the system. The new law to offer fiscal support 
to the ailing large institution to save the whole financial system, which I promoted as a Member of 
the House, became in effect in 1999. Second, the government applied the BIS regulation of equity 
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capital, which is for international large banks, to small domestic banks. Since the regulation is 
procyclical, it accelerated the recession through contracting loans. 
 The real growth rate declined to +0.5% in fiscal 1997, -1.0% in fiscal 1998, +0.9% in fiscal 1999, and 
-1.2% in fiscal 2001 after the IT bubble year’s +3.1% in fiscal 2000. The average growth rate during 
five years was only +0.5%. 
 Too hasty fiscal consolidation, two government failures, and resultant low growth of five years caused 
a decline in the expected rate of future growth. Business firms felt that investment, employment and 
financial debt were too large as compared with the expected rate of future low growth, and they had 
been restricting those three. [Chart3] As a result, fixed investment was lower than the level of fiscal 
1997 for 7 years until fiscal 2004, and bank lending continued to decrease until 2005 -- even by fiscal 
2016, they did not return to the level of fiscal 1997. 
 This is the initiating mechanism of “the loss of 15 years” (1988-2012). During the process, the 
business sector changed from the deficit sector to the surplus sector and the stage for “liquidity trap” 
and “non-traditional” monetary policy in the 21st century had been prepared. 
 
 
III. New Challenges of Monetary Policy 
1. Revision of the BOJ Law and Improvement in Policy Formation 
 Decline in the expected rate of growth of business firms, which was caused by policy failure of the 
government, resulted in a decline in the actual rate of growth through decrease in business 
investment, employment, and borrowings. The average growth rate, which was 1.9% in fiscal 1991-
96, declined to 0.6% in fiscal 1997-2002, and the CPI (excluding fresh food, core CPI) continued to 
decrease for 7 years from fiscal 1998 to fiscal 2004, a model of sustained true deflation. 
 The BOJ’s new challenges began with “zero interest rate policy” in September 1998 in which BOJ 
reduced the call money rate (overnight) to 0.25%. In March 2001, facing “the liquidity trap”, BOJ 
changed the operating target from the rate of interest to quantity of monetary aggregates, namely 
from 0.25% call money rate to 5 trillion yen commercial banks deposits with the BOJ, and decided to 
purchase long-term government bonds (JGBs) of 400 billion yen every month. Those targets were 
gradually increased and the amount of deposits with the BOJ reached 30-35 trillion yen, and that of 
government bond purchase to 1.2 trillion yen in January 2004. Further in October 2002, stocks held 
by banks became a target of BOJ purchase. BOJ declared that this “Quantitative Ease” (QE) policy 
would continue until the core CPI inflation rate had become stably positive (so-called “Time Axis” 
policy). 
 Those policies were the original model of the “QE” and “Time Axis” policies which were widely 
adopted by central banks of the U.S. and Europe after the Lehman Shocks in 2008. The BOJ was able 
to adopt such challenging “non-traditional” policies thanks to the revision of the BOJ law in April 
1998. Prime Minister Hashimoto had learned that, behind the two big failures of the post-war 
monetary policy, there existed in the BOJ law legalized during World War II the authority of the 
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government to direct BOJ monetary policy and to dismiss the Governor. He took strong leadership in 
revising the law. Under the new law, the Governor, two Deputy Governors, and 6 members of the 
Monetary Policy Board are appointed not by the government administration but by the Diet, and the 
Government has only an authority to claim for postponing the vote in the Monetary Policy Board. 
 
2. Transitory Exit from Deflation as well as Non-Traditional Policy 
 The first QE policy in the world, which started in Japan in 2001, resulted in an economic recovery 
with the average growth rate of 1.9% in fiscal 2003-07 and a positive core CPI inflation rate in fiscal 
year 2005-08. The main transmission channels of the policy were depreciation of the yen [Chart4] 
which caused a sharp increase in exports, a calming down of the financial turmoil and a decline in 
interest rates, which brought decreased bank lending to an end, and caused it to begin increasing in 
2005. The enormous supply of monetary base might have contributed to stock price increases and yen 
depreciation to a certain extent, but there is no evidence it directly stimulated expenditures through 
the portfolio rebalance effect. 
 In March 2006, the BOJ suspended QE policy as the inflation rate in core CPI became positive, and 
the operating target was changed again from BOJ deposits to the call money interest rate. In July 
and February 2007, BOJ raised the call money rate twice, each 0.25%, and the operating target 
became 0.5-0.75%. In order to get rid of a rise in the long term rate, the amount of purchase of long 
term bonds (JGBs) was kept unchanged. The amount of bank deposits with the BOJ was reduced to 
the  required reserve level by  BOJ selling operation in the money markets. 
 The exit policy was successful. The market yield of the ten years government bond remained 1.5%. 
The real growth rate were +1.2~+2.1% in fiscal 2005~2007. The core CPI Inflation rate  was 
+0.1~+1.2% in fiscal 2005-2008. 
 If the economy had gone further as it did, the period of deflation would have only been 1998-2004, 
and “the loss of 7 years” instead of “the loss of 15 years” would have been recorded. 
 
3. International Financial Turmoil and World Wide Recession  
 Unfortunately, the third surprise attack from aboard in Japan’s post-war economic history, following 
the Smithsonian Accord in 1971 and the Plaza Accord in 1985, came in autumn 2008. It was the 
world-wide recession triggered by the financial turmoil in the U.S., the so-called “Lehman Shock”. 
Japan’s real growth rate fell to -3.5% in fiscal 2008 and -2.2% in fiscal 2009. The inflation rate of the 
core CPI also fell to -1.6% in fiscal 2009 and -0.8% in fiscal 2010. Further, an unlucky occurrence was 
the great earthquake in north-east Japan in March 2011. The low growth rate of +0.5% in fiscal 2011 
and +0.9% in fiscal 2012 continued and the core CPI inflation rate was negative until fiscal 2012. 
Thus, they say today “the loss of 15 years” (1998-2012) instead of “7 years” (1998-2004). 
 The reason why the impact of the “Lehman Shock” on Japan was so deep, although Japan had no 
reactive financial turmoil in 2008, is mainly because the sharp appreciation of the yen together with 
worldwide recession caused a deep decrease in Japanese real exports -- as much as 20% in fiscal 2008-
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09, followed domestically by a fall in real fixed investment of 19% over the same years. The effective 
real rate of the yen had appreciated 30% in 2008-2012 since international speculative capital moved 
from the U.S. and Europe, which suffered from financial turmoil, to Japan with no turmoil. [Chart4] 
The ratio of central bank assets to GDP rose sharply in the suffering U.S. and Europe from 2008 while 
in Japan, with no turmoil, it rose only gradually in 2009-2012. [Chart 5] This is another reason for 
the yen’s sharp appreciation. 
 BOJ turned back to zero interest rate policy in 2008, and started to increase purchases of government 
bonds, stocks held by banks, and CPs towards 2009. In 2010 BOJ increased purchases of assets to 35 
trillion yen, and gradually further to 101 trillion yen until 2012. 
 
4. “Abenomics” and BOJ’s “QQE” 
 In late 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government started and launched the so-called 
“Abenomics”, which consist of three policies: bold monetary ease, positive fiscal policy, and structural 
reform. In early 2013, the government concluded an accord with the BOJ that the core CPI inflation 
target should be 2% and BOJ must aim at the target through more vigorous monetary ease. 
 In April 2013, BOJ announced the so-called “Quantitative and Qualitative Ease” policies (QQE). 
They are: (a) the operating target was changed from the call money rate to the monetary base which 
would be increased twice in two years; (b) 50 trillion yen government bonds (JGBs) of all terms 
including 40 years would be purchased every year; (c) 1 trillion yen ETF and 3.4 billion yen REIT 
would be purchased every year; (d) QQE (a to c) would continue until the inflation rate stably remains 
over 2%. 
 In October 2014, QQE was further expanded and the government bonds purchase and the increase 
in monetary base were raised to 80 trillion yen a year. 
 First clear effects of QQE appeared in the exchange rate and stock markets. The expected and actual 
rise in the ratio of BOJ assets to GDP caused 28% depreciation of the yen per U. S. dollar in 2013-15. 
[Chart4] [Chart5] Stock prices in Tokyo market rose 80 % in 2013-15. Those effects had, however, 
ended by 2015 when people begun to recognize that the effects on business recovery and increase in 
inflation rate were not so large as expected. The average growth rate in fiscal 2013 through fiscal 
2016 remained 1.1%, and the average inflation rate in core CPI was only 0.6%. 
 The reason for the limited effects of QQE on the real economy are mainly two. First, one of the 
Abenomics policies, the positive fiscal policy, has not been positive at all. Rather, it was stringent in 
2014 when the consumption tax increase of 3% was executed in April. In fiscal 2014, a big decline in 
real private consumption of -2.7% caused the real GDP growth rate to drop to -0.5%. In addition, 
another policy of Abenomics, structural reform of the economy, has so far not been decided and 
executed in any practical manner so the potential growth rate still remains +0.5%~1.0%. [Chart3] 
 Monetary policy alone cannot be effective enough to arouse the long stagnant economy. 
 Second, QQE itself is not effective enough. There is no empirical evidence that the tremendous 
increase in the monetary base has stimulated the economy directly through “portfolio rebalance 
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effects”. The transmission channel of QQE is observed mainly through the decline in real rate of short- 
and long-term interest rates. In January 2016, minus interest rate policy of -0.1% was implemented. 
However, it has to be limited because the further decline may undermine the profits of financial 
institutions. Besides, under the long trend of the low economic growth, private expenditures are not 
sensitive to an interest rate decline. 
 
5. Exit Policy and the Final Goal 
 It was a clever judgment that BOJ has changed the operating target from monetary base to the 
interest rate in September 2016. In 2017, BOJ is targeting -0.1% call money rate and about 0.0% 10 
year bond yield, and the yearly purchase of bonds seems to decrease from 80 trillion yen to about 60 
trillion yen (de facto “Tapering”). 
 Increase in bank lending and money supply over the year are gradually rising since the second half 
of fiscal 2016. Following the real growth rate of +1.2% in fiscal 2016, that for fiscal 2017 is estimated 
to reach +1.8% by members of BOJ Monetary Policy Board, which is substantially higher than the 
potential growth rate of less than +1.0%. The demand and supply gap of GDP  has narrowed, and 
the unemployment rate is 2.8% in June 2017, nearly full employment. 
 The BOJ seems to aim at realizing 2% inflation target sometime during fiscal 2018~2019. However, 
judging from the history of Japan’s economy since 1975 when the rapid growth was over, 2% inflation 
rate has appeared only at the time of inflation or asset bubbles. Now that Japan reaches almost full 
employment, the BOJ final policy goal from now on should be to sustain the economic growth with 
full employment. The 2% inflation target was adopted in 2013 to raise people’s expected rate of 
inflation so as to decrease the real rate of interest to stimulate the economy and to realize full 
employment. But the final goal, full employment, is almost achieved. Now that the final goal is being 
achieved, achieving the intermediate target is meaningless. It is rather risky. In Japan’s history, 
+1.0%~1.5% rises in core CPI is the state of price stability, and over +2% rise is a mild inflation. The 
mild inflation has the risk of undermining the sustained growth because it decreases the real income 
of workers, squeezes the business profits and distorts the income distribution and the resource 
allocation. 
 The important task for BOJ today is the exit policy from non-traditional monetary policy. In order 
to minimize the loss of BOJ at the time of interest rate rise, the assets held by the BOJ should be 
reduced gradually without stimulating the long term interest rate to rise sharply. 
 As for Abenomics, fiscal policy should not be stringent. Under sustained growth, the ratio of 
government debt to GDP will continue to decline as it does today. Concerning structural reform, a 
positive immigration policy is urgent to increase Japan’s working population. Japan’s real GDP 
growth per worker is the highest among G7 countries even in 2000~2010. [Chart6] The immigration 
will raise the potential growth rate, the natural rate of interest, and finally people’s expected rate of 
real growth. This in turn will raise the elasticity of private expenditures to the interest rate, and 
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Bubble Recession Recovery led by Private Sector Policy Recession
92 93 94 95 96 97 98
ＧＤＰ 1.1 -1.0 2.3 2.4 3.7 0.5 -1.0
Household 
Consumption
1.7 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.7 △0.8 0.4
Fixed 
Investment
△5.5 △14.0 △1.1 3.0 9.3 7.5 △5.2
Public 
investment
17.0 8.9 △1.9 7.9 △2.9 △6.0 2.0
Net Export 23.5 △4.6 △9.7 △33.9 △8.0 91.9 7.1
(% increase over the year)
[Note]  Figure 11 of the original book
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[Note]  Figure 24 of the original book
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[Note]  Figure 30 of the original book
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